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I.

Introduction
For many years, economists have studied the effects of executives on

firms’ performances. It is a consensus that the CEO of a firm is the main determinant of
performance. A manager of a sports club is very much like a CEO. The manager is
responsible for achieving the organizational objectives of a club by effective decisionmaking. Therefore, it is inevitable that a club’s performance is directly correlated with its
manager in charge. Many academics in the past found that the key cause of managerial
dismissals is bad performance (Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003; Balduck and Buelens,
2007; Audas et al., 1999). In this paper, I examine the effectiveness of these critical
decisions and determine whether such turnovers contribute to organizational goals of
clubs.
The main advantage of using sports as a way to evaluate the effects of manager
dismissals is transparency. Unlike many businesses, all soccer clubs have similar
organizational structures and goals. There is also less noise in the business and more
observable results—points. The points a club earns are better measures for success of the
manager than the financial earnings of a firm are (Holmstorm, 1982).
There are multiple theories on terminations of manager contracts. One hypothesis
is the “coach effect” also known as the “shock effect” and “honeymoon period” (Wirl and
Sagmeister, 2008; Balduck and Buelens, 2007; Hoffler and Slimka, 2003; Brown, 1982).
It is the very short-run boost effect once a new manager arrives. It is believed that a new
manager will incentivize players to be more enthusiastic in the first few periods. In a
way, the players have to prove that they deserve a place in the starting lineup. Therefore
they have an incentive to exert more effort, which possibly could result in a better
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performance in the next few games. However, as one can imagine, this effect lasts a very
short period of time. It is argued that the reverse effect kicks in once the shock effect
fades away. The players get used to the new manager as the manager starts to form an
idea about the squad therefore ending the honeymoon period. Gamson and Scotch’s
(1964) approach is divided into three hypotheses; the vicious-cycle hypothesis, the
scapegoating hypothesis and the common-sense hypothesis. In short, the vicious cycle
hypothesis claims that once a turnover takes place, chaos kicks in and the club
performance declines even more in the short-run future. Second, the common-sense
theory is the idea that the bad performance is directly related to the manager and,
therefore, after a dismissal the club’s performance is much better. Finally, the
scapegoating theory is maybe the most intriguing one; it defends the argument that firing
a manager is a way to explain the bad situation of a club by finding a credible victim to
blame. It argues that the board of directors is just looking for a ‘reason’ for the poor
performance that otherwise is ambiguous (Kesner and Sebora, 1994). These theories are
discussed in detail later in the paper.
Soccer has been around for many years and each country has developed different
soccer cultures. Soccer cultures are differentiated from country to country due to
distinctive media climates, importance of soccer for fans and how developed the business
side of soccer is in various countries. Turkey, unlike England, Spain, Italy, Germany, has
a weak business structure when it comes to soccer. Fans and the media have significant
power to manipulate clubs and their decisions. Consequently, relative to leagues such as
the English, where soccer is professional and media has not much influence on internal
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decisions within clubs, Turkey provides a great environment to test hypotheses to analyze
the effectiveness of Boards’ decisions to fire managers.
I analyze the presented theories through empirical evidence in the Turkish Super
League from 1998 – 20121. Following Koning (2000), Bruinshoofd & ter Weel (2003),
and Tena & Forrest (2007), a short and long run analysis are considered separately by
modeling in the context of varying time frames. I first talk about past research papers
based on this idea and then continue with construction of the data set. Finally, I discuss
methods to evaluate the issue. I find evidence for terminations that have no successful
recoveries.

II. Literature
Research on this subject is increasing, as soccer becomes more of a business in
the modern world. Many academics have done research on how terminations of manager
contracts affect performances in specific countries and regions (Salomo and Teichmann,
1999; Koning, 2003; Tena and Forrest, 2007; Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003; De Paola
and Scoppa, 2011; Wirl and Sagmeister, 2008; Frick et al., 2010; Balduck and Buelens,
2007). It first started with Grusky (1963) and Allen (1979) with their papers concluding
that turnovers result in negative effects in the Major Baseball League in the United States
especially if the new coach is from outside the club (and not an existing coach within).
Allen (1979) found that there is only an improvement in the subsequent season.
Following him, Brown (1982) found that there is no “coach effect” in the NFL. However,
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The name was Turkish Super League until 2004. From 2005-2010, it was Turkcell
Super League, and from 2011 on the official name became Super Toto Super League.
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due to the different hierarchal system of coaching in the NFL, I will not consider his
research in the analysis.
The scapegoat hypothesis became an interesting possible explanation for
dismissals in the 1980s (Brown, 1982). There have been many papers written and there is
much empirical evidence that supports the scapegoat hypothesis (Heuer et al., 2011; Tena
& Forrest, 2007, 2012; Audas et al., 2002). Audas and Goddard (2002) and Hughes et al.
(2010) could not find any evidence of improvement in the English leagues they have
analyzed after a manager termination in the short-run. Additionally, in Audas’ (2002)
study, he found that there is a slight negative impact in managerial turnovers but with an
increased variance, which means that the effect could even be positive on some
occasions. Similarly, in the Dutch league, the short-run affects are unambiguously
negative in the succeeding games after a change of manager (Koning, 2003; Bruinshoofd
and ter Weel, 2004). Koning (2003) claims that in the period he investigates, the number
of turnovers is notably high that there have to be other reasons that shareholders take
such actions. The fans and media are key elements in the decision making process of a
manager’s future at a club (Audas, 2002; Koning, 2003, Salomo and Teichmann, 2000).
In addition, Salomo and Teichmann (2000) detected experimental evidence that
besides media pressure, change in board, especially the president increases the chance of
being sacked. These studies by sports economists support the claim that the club’s
performance, once the manager is sacked, does not improve. In some cases, the
performance declines even more or it recovers from poor performance less quickly than
teams with similar performances but who have kept their managers, which is what
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happened in the Dutch Eredivisie2 and English Premier League (Dobson and Goddard,
1997; Bruinshoofd and ter Weel 2004). An interesting result came from Cannella and
Rowe (2005). They discovered that a positive effect of new coaches only occurs in high
rivalry contexts. This could be attributed to the high concentration and hope the new
coach brings to the players and their ambition to reach success by ‘overruling’ the rival
team(s). A sub-theory of the scapegoat hypothesis is called ‘Regression to the mean’
(Salomo and Teichmann 2000; Audas, 2002; Cannella and Rowe, 2005). This result came
directly from statistical theory; after extreme outcomes, the succeeding outcomes tend to
be closer to the mean. This means that after a dip of performance teams tend to do
slightly better in the next few periods. Bruinshoofd and ter Weel (2004) and Audas
(2002) controlled for this effect and found negative impact of manager dismissals on
team performance. It is also argued that due to the variability of this effect, the individual
influence of the manager cannot be evaluated (Gamson and Scotch, 1964). Khanna and
Poulsen (1995) argue that the effect is in fact commonplace. They found that firms in
financial trouble sack managers more often. In financially troubled clubs, the bad
performance cannot be blamed on the manager; other factors such as timely wage
payment, or the low quality of the squad due to debt, are significant causes for bad
performance. No one would perform well if they did not get paid.
The “Coach Effect” is another theory that has been a center of attention for many
economists in the field. The coach effect (shock effect) is a short-run concept, which
claims that once a new manager arrives, all the players have a shot at being a regular.
Hoffler and Slimka (2003) call this the “honeymoon period” of the team. According to

2

Dutch First Division
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Tena & Forrest’s (2007) research paper, there is a small positive effect of manager
turnovers in the home games during this period. This is attributed to the eager fans that
are looking for a change, supporting their team as much as they can. As one might
suspect, not as many fans go to away games and therefore this boost is not visible.
The vicious-cycle hypothesis is another concept that has been researched by
various economists. Studies have shown that a manager change mid-season worsens the
performance of the team due to information that is lost from the learning process of the
previous manager (Greiner, Cummings and Bhambri, 2002). Crossan (1999) claims that
the short run improvement is deceiving and that “learning takes time…”.
It is crucial to understand different perspectives to construct a control group for
this paper. One needs to consider other factors that might affect team performance. Many
researchers examined the causes of manager dismissals in depth to see whether there are
other factors that influence termination decisions significantly. It has been clear that bad
performance increases the chances of a manager’s contract being terminated. A British
economist, Bachan (2008) performed a study in the English League from 2002 until
2005, supporting results found in early literature. After controlling for coaching ability, it
has been observed that being in the relegation zone is much riskier when it comes to
terminations, which is a logical and expected outcome (Bachan, 2008; Tena & Forrest,
2007; Audas, 2002). Teams that are in the relegation zone tend to panic and bring change
as soon as possible to stay in the division. Several studies that have been conducted on
the age, past experience, salary and statistics have shown that high age tends to increase
the chance of dismissal while, on the other hand, the experience of coach seems to
decrease the likelihood of a dismissal (Hautsch et al, 2001; Salomo and Teichmann,
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2000; Porter and Scully, 1982). Another interesting result came from Tena (2007) and
Frick et al. (2010). In their papers, they found that higher salary and higher budget
encourages the shareholders to dismiss managers. This can be credited to the team
expectations. A higher paid manager has a higher expected rate of return and a higher
budget club is more likely to have higher expectations such as the league title or the
UEFA Champions League qualification.3
As one can see, the consequences of turnovers mid-season are quite ambiguous
due to various studies. Some researchers think it has positive consequences (Fabianic,
1994) while some argue the opposite (Maximiano, 2006). In my study, I do not discuss
the causes of turnovers. I instead focus on whether the decision of dismissing a manager
is effective in the short run and in the long run, and what affects the ex-post performance
of a team once a firing takes place.

III. Data
In this section, I give a brief summary of the relevant data in the subject and how
it was collected. I give background information on the league and then continue with
basic statistics from the Turkish Super League from 1998 until 2012. It is important to
determine how concepts such as performance, success, and failure are defined.
Therefore, before any evaluation, all relevant terms are defined. Another key ingredient is
the variables considered in the regression. In parts C through F, I focus on what variables
were considered and what variables were used in forming a control group to end up with
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UEFA Champions League is an annual continental club soccer competition and is
known to be the most prestigious tournament in not just European soccer but also the
entire world.
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a healthier and clearer regression analysis. The short-run model consists of the analysis of
a total of eight games (four preceding and four succeeding a termination) whereas the
long-run model consists of the entire season. Details of each model are discussed later.

A. League
The Turkish Super League is the top soccer division in Turkey. It consists of 18 teams
formed from all male players. Each team plays all other teams twice (one away and one
home), so there are 34 match days. Each win is awarded with three points, each tie is
awarded with one point and a loss is awarded with zero points. At the end of the season,
the bottom three teams get relegated to the lower division. The team with the highest
number of points wins the title.4 There have been 30 different teams in the league since
1998. Interestingly, only four teams have won the title within these years. The schedule is
similar to a European soccer schedule; starting in August going until January, a two-week
break and then ending in early May. Data is available for all the games within this period
including all team players, coaches at the time, and points before and after each game and
locations.

B. Dismissals
In the past 14 years there have been 4284 games played and 376 total managerial
contracts for 30 teams in the Turkish Super League. 190 of these were end of contracts,
while 186 of these contracts were either terminated by the club or by both parties
(meaning voluntarily or involuntarily) 5 . We do not distinguish between these since
voluntary resignations are mostly cases where fans and media provoke resignation. Out
4

Exception: 2011-2012 was played with the Play-Off system. At the end of the season
the top 4 teams are put in a group starting with half of their points in the regular season.
Each team plays 6 games (home-away) in a ‘mini-league’ format.
5 Turkish Football Association Official Website: www.tff.org
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of these 186 terminations, there were 117 mid-season, 41 summer and 28 winter
turnovers. There have been near 16 mid-season turnovers on average per season for 18
teams every year. Realize how large this number is. The English Premier League average
number of mid-season manager dismissals in the last five years is around seven per
season for 20 teams 6 (Koning, 2003). The excess nine turnovers bring doubt on the
effectiveness of manager sackings. We exclude summer and winter turnovers since the
team squads also change during those periods; the direct effect of a new coach is vague
due to altered team quality and opponent qualities. We also do not consider end of
contracts since they are almost always at the end of seasons.

C. The ‘Regression’ – Short Run
In this section, I briefly introduce the regression model. In the regression model, the
dependent variable Y is the performance after the dismissal because that’s the key
statistic that determines the value of managerial changes. Alternatively, the difference
between the performances post and ante is a likely candidate for the dependent variable,
which is explored later in the paper (see Robustness). Only variables that could possibly
and easily be collected and interpreted are used in the analysis. These variables are
performance before the turnover, club budget, coaching experience, position of team,
opponent quality and team average quality. Variables such as old coach ability, new
coach ability, location, team expectations are trickier to quantify. Ability of coaches is
measured by looking at past experiences and recording successes and failures. Team
expectations are measured by looking at the recent history of the club7. Precisely, the
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Turkish Football Association Official Website: www.tff.org
Note that the quality of a team, i.e. the ending ranking in the current year might have
been useful however would have caused an endogeneity problem as the dependent
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average number of points per game is used as a proxy for ability of coaches. Variables
such as changes in board and promoted teams are the dummy variables. They will get a
value of one if there are any changes in the board or if the team was promoted into the
division that year and will get zero otherwise.
Due to the intricacy of the problem, the starting equation (1) will change over time as
each alteration is explained and interpreted in a logical and efficient manner.

Υ

Υ

(1)

D. The ‘Regression’ – Long Run
I will be running a long-run regression to see whether the expected performance
increase occurs after the new manager has a few weeks to adjust. The answer to this
question might change the entire outcome of the thesis. If there is an obvious
performance increase in the long run but not the short run, this might mean that the
termination was effective. However if there is an opposite result, this might support the
coach effect that was discussed earlier in the introduction. The long run is a more
complicated question due to variables that cannot be controlled for (such as ‘team
expectations’). To fix some problems that arise when looking in the long run, the data
was adjusted to include extra variables such as ‘games played before’ and ‘games played
after’ (see Issues). The initial regression model follows the same intuition but excludes
variables that relate only to short run.

variable ex-post points determines the ending ranking of a team. This was avoided by
including the team expectations variable instead of team quality (ending ranking) without
losing much information about the quality of the team.
11

Υ
Υ

(2)

E. Measurement of Performance
In order to measure the before and after performances of teams once a termination
takes place, I use points as reference points. A win (three points) is an obvious evidence
for good performance. Not many managers get fired right after they win a game. A loss,
on the other hand, could be a sign of poor performance depending on the quality of the
opponent and the team itself. A team trying to survive in the league losing against the
titleholder is not a sign of poor performance necessarily. In order to distinguish between
poor and good performance, we require a benchmark performance level. Bruinsfhood and
ter Weel (2003) offer various options for a benchmark level. Since this benchmark is
different for every team—that is, performing poorly is defined differently for every
team—we use an objective proxy. Following Bruinsfhood and ter Weel (2003), we
consider the past four games of each dismissal in the league to see if there is solid
evidence of poor performance. This number should balance the short-run concept and
give us a variety of opponents. Then we consider the first four games after the dismissal
to see the effects of the new head coach on the team’s performance. To do this, the total
number of points are collected, recorded within those four games and used for the
regression.
Key variables that influence the team’s performance are club budget, coaching
experience, ability of the old and new coaches, team quality, opponent quality, changes in
board, game locations, position of team, team expectations, and salary of old coach. In
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order to determine if hiring a new manager is effective, a control group is created. It
consists of teams that perform as poorly but take no action whatsoever regarding the
manager (see Construction of Control Group). The main disparities are the average points
before and after the dismissal date. The control group plays a crucial role determining the
effectiveness of managers by illustrating the regression to the mean effect, which is
discussed later in the paper.
F. Variables
Some variables will be included in the long run or short run only, whereas some
variables will be included in both. The reasons for each variable are explained below.
This section discusses why some variables are included in the model and how problems
with the variables are fixed throughout the research. In order to best capture the
effectiveness of managerial dismissals, it is important to consider each variable and its
intuitive importance in the regression. The statistical importance of variables are analyzed
and, if certain variables that turn out to be statistically relevant are further examined.

Ex-Post Performance (xp/xap): this variable is the main dependent variable in
the model. xp is the number of points won in the four games after the dismissal whereas
xap is the percentage of points won in the rest of the season. xp and xap are used in the
short-run and long-run regression models, respectively.
Ex-Ante Performance (xa/xaa): is included in the short-run and long-run
regression equations as independent variable. xa and xaa are measured similarly as in expost performance. Furthermore, the data is used to find the control group-teams that have
similar performances but did not dismiss their managers.

13

Club Budget (bdg): when thinking about successful teams in the past, it seems
like teams with high club budgets are successful. Even though there might be a circular
reasoning in this argument, the model will determine if there is an effect at all. Thus, we
introduce this variable which measures the annual club budget in millions of U.S.
Dollars. A higher club budget does not just lead to higher and guaranteed wages for
players, which inevitably motivate players more to perform well but also allows teams to
attract better players. This is included in the short-run and long-run models.
Experience (exp): records the number of years that the manager worked as a
head coach. The experience of the new manager is relevant because highly experienced
managers tend to make fewer novice mistakes and have learned certain things over time
that can put them into advantageous situations. A great manager with zero experience
might make a stupid decision under pressure that might cause poor performance, whereas
an experienced manager, from experience, might make a better decision. This variable
appears in both models. Furthermore, it is also used to form another independent variable
multiple (see multiple below).
Team Position (tpos): measures the position of the team at the time of the
dismissal with one being the top rank. The current team position reflects the most about
the teams’ ex-ante performance. There is a high correlation between this variable and
performance before the dismissal within that season. However, this correlation is not
significantly decreasing the significance of the other variables; therefore it is included in
the regression to give an idea of the significance of an extra point, thus reflecting how
much pressure the team is underneath (see Issues). Team position makes more sense
when used with Team Expectations, because team is underperforming only if it is
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positioned below its expected position. It is included in both versions and both short-run
and long-run regressions.
Ex-Ante Opponent Quality (oqante): is the sum of the average team positions
of the opponents, which is a decent index to measure the difficulty of the four-game
period. This variable reflects the difficulty of the teams played in the short run model.
The lower it is, the harder the fixture of the team. This is included in the model in order
to take into account the effect of harder or easier teams on performance. A team with a
low expected position might play tough teams, which might not necessarily mean that the
team is underperforming. Because this variable only includes teams in the four games, it
is not included in the long run model.
Team Expectations (tavq): is the average position of the teams in the last five
years of participation in the division8. The team expectations variable is a significant
variable to include in the model. A team is underperforming only if it is performing
below the expected performance.
Old Coach Ability (ocabil): we measure the ability of a coach by averaging
points earned per game over his/her entire career. It reflects how much the old coach that
was fired can affect the team’s performance. A high averaged coach is more likely to
have more of a positive contribution on the performance of a team. This variable is
included in both short-run and long-run regressions. It appears either alone or as the
difference between the old and new coach abilities. Note that, an old coach can have
effects on teams that could last even after his dismissal. Such effects include formation,

8

Promoted teams that might not have participated in the division in all of the five years
are measured by taking the average of the years that they have participated.
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set pieces, and tactics. And therefore, this effect can be measured by including old coach
ability as an independent variable in the model.
Ex-Ante Location (ahome): counts the number of home games in the preceding
four games of a team. Location matters highly in the soccer world. Playing in a field that
players are used to, in front of their own fans, gives them a confidence that cannot be
achieved in games in other stadiums. Usually, teams alternate and play one week home
and one week away; however, there are special circumstances that might have two away
games in a row or vice versa. This variable is only used in the short-run analysis.
Promoted (prom): is a dummy variable that is assigned a one if the team is
promoted from the lower division into the First division the previous year and zero
otherwise. Newly promoted teams tend to have less pressure and tend to be more volatile.
A highly skilled coach might be able to influence a promoted team less due to low
expectations and confidence of the club in a rigorous division. On the other hand, players
might over perform in certain situations in order to get the attention of many more scouts
that observe the First division and are interested in transferring players.
New coach ability, ex-post Opponent Quality, ex-post home games, week, board,
multiple, promoted, promoted team quality, and promoted new coach ability are
other variables that play crucial roles in the regression analysis. See appendix for
definitions and functions of these variables.

F. Other Data
The following data was collected in order to aid the regression in ways that will be
discussed later in the paper.
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Ex-Post Games (gp): is the number of games played under the new coach. It is
only used in the long-run model because for the short-run model this is fixed to be four
for all observations. On some occasions, the dismissal takes place late in the season and
early on others. This creates a difference in the number of games coached by the new
coaches. The high variance associated with a low number of games creates an ambiguity
in analyzing the results.
Ex-Ante Games (gp4): analogously, this variable is the number of games played
before the dismissal under the old coach.

IV. Model
Now, the control group is formed and discussed. Following, the model is
introduced in a detailed manner.

A. Construction of a Control Group
In order to first answer the question of whether firing aids teams, a control group has
to be formed. The reason behind this lies in comparing performance changes by
employing a method called difference-in-difference9.
The motive for constructing a control group is to measure the usefulness of a
dismissal that occurred mid-season. If teams with who did fire their managers recover
stronger than teams who did not fire their managers, then this can be used as direct
evidence for the efficacy of mid-season managerial turnovers. Additionally, the control
group can be used to determine how much of the improvement in performance is due to

9

This method is also employed by Bruinshoofd and ter Weel (2003) in their analysis of
the Dutch League managerial dismissals.
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coaches and how much is due to regression to the mean10.
Firstly, teams that exhibited similar ex-ante performances as the regression group
are selected after a benchmark average point was determined. Observations with similar
performance and no sacking are the most straightforward alternative (Bruinshoofd and ter
Weel, 2003). The cutoff line between performing poorly and not poorly is decided to be
one point per game in a four-game period. The benchmark point is selected by looking at
the average points before a dismissal of the regression group observations. Thus, any
time a team earns less than four points in any given four consecutive games that period is
included as an observation for the control group.11 Points during the four-game period
before and after are used to measure performance after and before. The same
observations are also used to get long-run recovery observations. That is, data is collected
similar to the long-run data collection for the regression group discussed earlier.
Figure 1 compares the ex-ante performances of the control group and the
regression group. As one can see, the control group and the regression group have similar
performance levels except for the small number of sackings that occurred even after
decent performances12. The average points for the control group before a performance dip
is 2.98 whereas this number for the regression group is 3.05. Thus one can conclude that
similar observations were chosen to compare these two groups.

10

As defined earlier, regression to the mean is the issue that if a variable takes an
extreme value, the surrounding measurements tend to be closer to the average.
11 Note that any observation that had a managerial turnover was excluded from the
control group.
12
Ex-ante performances with more than four points in the four game period.
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Figure 1. Ex-Ante Performance Data Comparison

B. Effectiveness of Manager Dismissals
The paper continues by explaining how the control group is used to measure the
effectiveness of managerial turnovers in the Turkish First Division.
The differences between ex-post and ex-ante performances are recorded for both
groups. Then, the difference between the differences, which were recorded, is calculated,
hence arriving at our difference-in-difference estimator.
Table 1. Difference-In-Difference Estimator Descriptive Statistics
(Xp – Xa)

(Xpc – Xac)

(Xp – Xa) - (Xpc – Xac)

1.487

1.603

-0.1157

Std Dev.

(0.2767)

(0.3379)

(1.084)

t-statistic

5.374**

Test Statistic
Coefficient

4.743**
** Significant at 1% level

-0.1067

The first column in Table 1 depicts the improvement after a dismissal during mid-
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season. Indeed, teams perform about 1.5 points better once a dismissal occurs. However,
a second glance at the table casts doubt on the cause of the improvement. The second
column reveals that control group teams recover even better (about 0.11 more points on
average) than teams that actually fired their coaches. The difference-in-difference
estimator’s t-statistic is calculated to be -0.1067 suggesting no significant difference
between groups. This implies that firing managers are not effective and teams who take
action should not fire managers hoping for a greater recovery compared to teams who do
not take action. This method also takes care of the regression to the mean issue. One
might think that part of the improvement is due to the regression to the mean; however,
the entire effect in the control group is the regression to the mean effect. A turnover
hence would only improve performance if its coefficient were higher than that of the
regression to the mean effect, which is not the case.
It should be noted that some firings did lead to superior performance. In the
following pages, we seek to discover the characteristics associated with improved
performance with a coach replacement.

C. Issues
In this section, we discuss the issues related to the regression models introduced
earlier. The initial model constructed by “soccer” intuition is analyzed with econometric
and statistical methods in order to have a better understanding of the effects of a new
coach. Problems that are notorious in econometrics such as endogeneity and
heteroskedasticity as well as various tests are given further attention and resolved in an
appropriate fashion. In addition, some variables that hurt the regression due to
multicollinearity will be considered in the analysis of the model.

20

Outliiers – RStud
dent & DFBE
ETAS:
Influence statistics arre used to diiscover singgle observatiions that aree extreme annd
highlly influential to the mod
del and therrefore, thesee observationns may be cconsidered tto
omit in order to not influencce the modell with only oone variablee. We use D
DFBETAS annd
RStud
dent tests that
t
measuree the differrence that a single obbservation m
makes to thhe
regression resultts. RStudentt measures the ratio oof the residuual of the model to aan
estim
mated standaard deviation
n, while DF
FBETAS meeasures the scaled diffeerence in thhe
estim
mated coefficcients betweeen the original equatiion and thee regressionn line that is
estim
mated withou
ut the outlier..

Figure 2.
2 DFBETAS
S – Board Va
Variable Outlliers

One can realize thee peculiarity
y of one siingle observvation in thhe Figure 22,
2
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above. DFBETA
AS statisticall method is made use of in order to discoverr observatioon
ber 48 that had a criticcal impact on
o the variaable board. A further llook into thhe
numb
variaable indeed confirms th
he test. Thee observatioon includess a dramaticc boardroom
m
chang
ge, specificcally a resig
gnation of the
t main diirector of thhe club righht before thhe
dismissal. Since there mightt be addition
nal factors th
that cannot bbe measuredd in a chaotiic
perio
od as such, and
a since it is the only variable witth such a chhange the vaariable boarrd
13
is om
mitted from the
t entire model.
m

Figu
ure 3. RStudeent – Influennce Statisticss

RStu
udent test is run to reveaal the outlieers in the lonng run moddel and as onne can see iin
Figurre 3 there exists an outlier
o
in our
o sample.. The RStuudent test ssuggests thaat
obserrvation 87 is significantly differeent in that iits residual is nearly ttwo standarrd
13

No
otice that om
mitting the vaariable and omitting the oobservation are equivaleent since
there is only one observation that takes a value of 1 inn the samplee.
2
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deviations away from zero. This observation was carefully reviewed and there is
indeed a peculiarity associated with this observation. The observation included a top
team that had European fixtures, cup fixtures as well as league fixtures within the four
game period in addition to an investigation from UEFA 14 which might have
cumulatively caused stress resulting in strange performance given the independent
variables. Therefore, in order to not alter the model based on an outlier, this
observation was taken out of the regression.
Heteroskedasticity
In the long-run version of the model, there exists an issue to be resolved before
beginning the analysis. When comparing different observations in the long run, there is
not a fixed number of games. Certain observations entail fewer games than others
depending on the date of the turnover. Some new managers coach for more than 20
games whereas some only for five. Because the dependent variables in this regression are
percentages, it is easier to have a high percentage by winning only a few games if the
number of games played is a small.
Table 2. EViews Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
F- Statistic
Obs*R-Squared
Scaled Expl. SS

10.31406 Prob. F(79,36)
9.624265 Prob. Chi-Square(79)
12.82434 Prob. Chi-Square(79)
**Reject Null Hypothesis at 1% level

0.0017**
0.0019**
0.0003**

To test for heteroskedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test was run on the
long run model. The null hypothesis, which is the existence of homoskedasticity, is
rejected at the five percent significance level (see second column above). This means that
14

Union of European Football Association
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indeed the hypothesis that heteroskedascity exists cannot be rejected.
If the model is sorted in ascending order of games played, then the Figure 4
explains the problem. Therefore, the model is weighted inversely with the variable gp2.
One can see the correlation between the residuals in the figure.

Figure 4. Heteroskedasticity – Residuals of Ordered Observations

As the games played increases, the variance associated with the residuals
decreases, strengthening the stability of the model. To understand clearly, one can think
of it as two sub-populations (ones with less than 10 games played and ones with more
than 10). These two sub-populations have different variances than one another. Once the
model is adjusted, the following (Table 3) portrays the new model’s regression table for
the long run.
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Table 3. Weighted Long Run Initial Model
Dependent Variable: XPP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/06/13 Time: 14:43
Sample: 1 86 88 117
Included observations: 116
Weighting series: GP^2
Weight type: Inverse variance (average scaling)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
XAP
BDG
PNCA
MULTPL
NCABIL
OCABIL
TAVQ
W
TPOS
EXPRNC
PROM
PTQ

0.393071
-0.010934
2.41E-09
-0.199882
0.007110
0.088752
-0.011404
-0.002436
-0.001048
-0.002498
-0.009110
0.206040
0.000671

0.146568
0.115694
1.85E-09
0.130826
0.005842
0.059554
0.034227
0.003594
0.001909
0.004472
0.008043
0.216460
0.008744

2.681828
-0.094504
1.304575
-1.527846
1.217176
1.490283
-0.333175
-0.677818
-0.548958
-0.558514
-1.132617
0.951861
0.076725

0.0085
0.9249
0.1949
0.1296
0.2263
0.1392
0.7397
0.4994
0.5842
0.5777
0.2600
0.3434
0.9390

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.295003
0.212868
0.089115
0.817968
122.7654
3.591667
0.000173

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
Weighted mean dep.

0.379419
0.234155
-1.892507
-1.583915
-1.767236
1.794945
0.433950

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Durbin-Watson stat

0.220485
0.129668
0.148894
1.771922

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

0.410333
0.159600
2.283439

Elimination
The initial short-run model presented in the earlier sections yield Table 4. The model
seems to include variables with low significance and this might be caused by correlated
variables or redundant variables that might have been double counted (See Table 4).
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Table 4. Short Run Initial Model
Dependent Variable: XP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/13/13 Time: 12:31
Sample: 1 117
Included observations: 117
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

C
XA
PHOME
AHOME
EXPRNC
MULTPL
NCABIL
OCABIL
OQPOST
OQANTE
TPOS
TAVQ
PTQ
PROM
PNCA
W
BDG
BRD

-5.282171
-0.059613
1.011446
1.081434
-0.029847
0.013145
3.630229
-1.125871
0.044433
0.029270
-0.110555
0.125056
-0.402651
5.226471
-0.410931
-0.000216
2.55E-08
2.083276

3.650269
0.142637
0.473067
0.592422
0.205751
0.154224
1.165829
0.975695
0.026447
0.025666
0.084420
0.091282
0.238485
4.749238
2.611391
0.028021
4.90E-08
2.512256

-1.447063
-0.417939
2.138061
1.825445
-0.145063
0.085234
3.113860
-1.153917
1.680092
1.140419
-1.309583
1.369998
-1.688366
1.100486
-0.157361
-0.007698
0.520524
0.829245

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.328274
0.212927
2.335519
540.0101
-255.4865
2.845975
0.000620

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

Prob.
0.1510
0.6769
0.0350**
0.0709*
0.8850
0.9322
0.0024***
0.2513
0.0961*
0.2569
0.1934
0.1738
0.0945*
0.2738
0.8753
0.9939
0.6039
0.4090
4.606838
2.632546
4.674983
5.099933
4.847508
1.868411

*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level.
For instance, the p-values of multpl and exprnc are 0.91 and 0.99 respectively which
suggests the insignificance of these variables. However, one should note that the
correlation coefficient between these variables is 0.98. Therefore, before concluding
anything about these variables we need to check the model by excluding only one of
them to see the significance of each individual variable. When deciding what action to
take when comparing two correlated variables, one needs to consider the individual
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contribution to the regression as well as the insignificance reductions of other variables15
caused by including the variable in the regression. First, note that multpl is defined as the
product of exprnc and ncabil. The variable ncabil’s range is around 1 and its variance is
low, which explains why the correlation coefficient is quite high. Exclusion of multpl, it
turns out, does increase the significance of the other variables. Thus, multpl was excluded
from the model but exprnc is still included in the model. One reason of the low
significance of these variables might be that even though experience gives an idea of the
probability of novice mistakes from the new coach, this aspect might already be reflected
in the ncabil variable. In addition, exprnc and multpl were regressed with variables that
had near-zero correlation coefficients and similar insignificance was observed. The longrun model was also examined for the significances and correlations for the same
variables.
The similar procedure yields the same result; that is, exprnc is best left in and
multpl is best left outside the model and exclusion of multpl does more benefit than harm
to the regression.

15

We will refer to this effect as “harming” other variables.
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Figure 5. Trend - Ante-Performance vs. Week
The intuitive meaning of the left hand side of our regression equation is the performance
under the new coach. Therefore, expecting variables related to ex-ante performance to
explain the ex-post performance is not the most logical argument unless there are other
reasons we might want to factor in. These variables were included and recorded firstly in
order to explain the change of performance and will be used further on in the paper in
order to check for robustness. However for now, “ante variables” (oqante, ahome, xa,
xap) will be excluded in order to avoid any confusion associated with the true meaning
and analysis of the regression model. The variable ocabil is analyzed within the model
and found to be insignificant, even though there was enough reason to believe that it
might influence ex-post performance as stated earlier. Similar results can be argued for
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xap, xa and oqante.
The variable that records the matchday of the first game of the new coach, week
(w), is observed to be consistently insignificant in the long-run model as well as the shortrun model. Exclusion of this variable leads to upturns in significances of other variables
and inclusion of it contributes indiscernibly to the model. The reason why the week
variable was recorded is that turnovers that occur in later weeks are exposed to more
pressure due to the time limit whereas turnovers that occur in earlier matchdays of the
season have no such worry. The pressure can be realized mostly in the ex-ante
performance variable. High pressure increases the likelihood of a firing; thus, it is
expected that turnovers that occur in later weeks could have better ex-ante performances
than dismissals that occur early on in the season (Audas, 2002; Konig, 2003). The
following figure is evidence of the opposite and can be used to logically eliminate this
variable from the model. Figure 5 depicts the relationship between ex-ante performance
and the time of the dismissal.
Table 5. Performances based on Matchdays

Ex-Ante Performance (Xa)
Turnover Week16

<17 (1st Half of Season)

>17 (2nd Half of Season)

Mean

3.116

3.125

Std. Dev.

1.959413

2.339531

As one can see, there is no trend between the turnovers and the direct
performance before a turnover occurs. Table 5 strengthens the argument by comparing
the sample means of performances before and after a given dismissal. The miniscule
difference between the means and considerably close standard deviations support our
16

No observation on the 17th week exists.
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claim.
Table 6. Short-Run Edited Model
Dependent Variable: XP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/13/13 Time: 20:42
Sample: 1 117
Included observations: 117
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
PHOME
NCABIL
TPOS
TAVQ
PROM
PTQ
PNCA

-2.181193
1.094058
3.695695
-0.095120
0.097827
5.255042
-0.418205
-0.322220

2.154434
0.458337
1.007863
0.069165
0.081727
4.470785
0.228571
2.401300

-1.012421
2.387018
3.666862
-1.375255
1.196996
1.175418
-1.829650
-0.134186

0.3136
0.0187**
0.0004**
0.1719
0.2339
0.2424
0.0700*
0.8935

0.267005
0.219932
2.325103
589.2654
-260.5929
5.672136
0.000013

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

4.606838
2.632546
4.591332
4.780199
4.668009
1.805868

*Significant at %10 level, **Significant at %5 level.
To understand the regression results, we need to consider each variable in relation to
soccer as well as their significances mathematically. The variable bdg (budget) seems to
be highly insignificance in Table 4. The budget of a club surprisingly does not matter17.
Most successful clubs in the world have high budgets and therefore this result is
unanticipated. One reason might be that the budget is captured by the new coach ability,
average team quality and other variables that are correlated to the budget of a club. A
club that has a high budget might perform better and thus may already have performed
better which can be seen in the average team quality variable. In addition, the higher the
coach ability the more costly the coach is likely to be and this might also include the
17

The coefficient of the budget variable is infinitesimal. At first glance, it might seem
odd, however the budget is in millions of dollars and the dependent variable (xp) has a
numerical range from 0 to 12.
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budget effect that we were expecting. In order to evaluate this concept, a quick scatter
plot was constructed as can be seen in Figure 6 (See appendix for other related figures).
Although a clear trend is not visible in the illustration of the relationship between these
two variables, one can unambiguously see that teams with higher budgets do hire the
most skillful coaches. Moreover, a similar pattern can be observed between budget and
team average quality. Therefore, this variable is also excluded from the model, thereby
arriving at our edited version of the short-run and long-run models.

Figure 6. Budget vs. New Coach Ability
Coefficient Analysis & Structural Differences
Some of the observations in the model include teams that are just promoted that year
into the Turkish 1st Division. Promoted teams tend to appear easy as targets in general
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(Tena, 2006). This is due to their inexperience in the first division against strong and
historical teams that have much more qualified players. This inexperience, at times,
causes fear and critical mistakes in games. Therefore, there might be a structural
difference between the functional form of promoted teams and that of all the other teams.
The dummy variable prom was multiplied with tavq and ncabil to see whether promoted
teams have different weights for their past performance and their newly hired coach. It
might be that a highly successful coach might not be able to reflect his skills on the pitch
by coaching an inexperienced team. Furthermore, the average quality of a promoted team
might not reflect the true quality of the team if the team has only played a few seasons in
the Turkish First Division. To check if there is a structural difference, that is a different
slope and different intercept for promoted teams. The Wald test was used to check the
joint significance of these variables.
Table 7. Joint Significance – Promoted Teams (Short-Run)
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(PTQ)=0, C(PNCA)=0, C(PROM)=0
Equation: SHORTRUN
Test Statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

Value

df

Probability

1.240855
3.722564

(3, 107)
3

0.2986
0.2930

Our claim that promoted teams might be structurally different fails at the five percent
significance level. Therefore, we cannot conclude that average historical performance and
coach ability have different effects on newly promoted teams nor that they have different
intercepts. However, a more interesting result can be seen in the long run model. One
might expect that the joint significance of three insignificant variables might be also
insignificant but this is not the case in this particular situation.
Table 8. Joint Significance – Promoted Teams (Long-Run)
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Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(PTQ)=0, C(PNCA)=0, C(PROM)=0
Equation: LONGRUN
Test Statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

Value

df

Probability

3.136894
9.410681

(3, 108)
3

0.0284**
0.0243**

**Significant at %5 level.
In the long-run model, we can conclude that overall promoted teams are in fact different
than non-promoted teams. Even though we do not have the ability to individually
compare new coach effects, team history effects and/or intercepts in promoted and nonpromoted teams, we can definitively make an overall judgment about these particular
teams.
Table 9. Long Run Edited Model
Dependent Variable: XPP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/13/13 Time: 13:28
Sample: 1 86 88 117
Included observations: 116
Weighting series: GP^2
Weight type: Inverse variance (average scaling)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
NCABIL
EXPRNC
TPOS
TAVQ
PTQ
PNCA
PROM

0.314142
0.147542
0.000589
-0.002491
-0.003586
-3.20E-05
-0.157042
0.152890

0.091852
0.047908
0.001248
0.002670
0.003340
0.008564
0.120614
0.204345

3.420069
3.079720
0.472199
-0.932986
-1.073631
-0.003734
-1.302016
0.748196

0.0009
0.0026**
0.6377
0.3529
0.2854
0.9970
0.1957
0.4560

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.270814
0.223552
0.088508
0.846034
120.8087
5.730051
0.000012

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
Weighted mean dep.

0.379419
0.234155
-1.944978
-1.755075
-1.867888
1.743008
0.433950

Unweighted Statistics
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R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Durbin-Watson stat

0.252189
0.203720
0.142419
1.690288

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

0.410333
0.159600
2.190569

**Significant at %5 level.

D. Discussion
After an in-depth econometric analysis, the paper will continue by discussing these
results from a soccer fan’s point of view. By gathering approaches and ideas from
literature in the topic, concrete results were established in both the short-run and long-run
models.
The short-run model estimated that among many factors, playing at home is one of
the most important factors that increase the performance of a team once a new coach
takes over. This result was also observed in Tena & Forrest’s (2007) research conducted
in the Spanish La Liga18. Tena & Forrest (2007) observed a small improvement in games
that were played at home after a turnover. In our analysis, we observed phome to have a
strong positive and highly significant coefficient, which implies that there is indeed home
advantage in that teams who play more games at home within the four games subsequent
to the dismissal, are more likely to perform better than teams who play away. Fan support
throughout soccer history has proven to be a strong advantage and our analysis does
nothing but support this argument. Our analysis suggests that teams who play one more
game at home in the given four games after a dismissal will typically earn one more
point.
Another variable that seemed to be highly crucial is the ability of the new coach. This
result is intuitive and not surprising; however, what is surprising is the way it is
18

Spanish 1st Division
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measured. Many critics in the field have either not found efficient proxies for coach
ability or have used proxies like experience or number of top teams managed (De Paola
& Scoppa 2008; Frick & Simmons, 2008). Using average number of points in a coach’s
entire career has proven to be an efficient and intuitively accurate factor that determines
the ex-post performance. New coach ability not only explains performance but also
includes many additional factors such as the budget of a team, and the expectations of the
team 19 . We see that ncabil is significant throughout our analysis similarly to phome.
Findings suggest that a coach that has one more point per game in his entire career will
on average earn around 3.5 points more in a four-game period when he takes over a team.
The last variable that attracts considerable attention is how differently promoted
teams’ histories affect their performances comparatively to non-promoted teams. Recall
that quality is measured by rank so a greater number implies a lower quality. It appears
that team average quality in general has a positive coefficient meaning that the more
successful the team has performed in the past five years, the worse they will perform in
the direct four games after a turnover but the coefficient is not significant. For promoted
teams however, this variable has a negative and significant coefficient. The past five-year
performance of promoted teams explains considerably more than teams who have been in
the division a year ago. The negative coefficient suggests that teams who have performed
one ranking higher in earlier seasons will earn on average about 0.41 more points than
teams ranked one ranking lower.
In the long run, things get less conclusive as the edited model in the long run yields
distinctive results. The only variable that seems to be significant at the five percent level
19

A team with a higher budget or successful history will hire more skilled coaches in
order to be successful.
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is the new coach ability. Specifically, teams who hire coaches that average one point
higher per game in their careers end up winning 15% more of their games in the
remaining of the season. This result surely supports the argument that the new coach
ability is the key factor overall in determining long-run performance. Additionally, other
variables seem to explain the ex-post performance and are jointly significant but
individually it is difficult to measure their marginal influences since they are insignificant
individually. Similarly to the short-run model, these variables include experience, team
quality, team position, promoted team quality and the promoted dummy.

E. Robustness
In order to effectively claim a conclusion about the factors that ex-post effect, we will
test for robustness by answering the same question from a different standpoint. After all,
these results could have just fit by coincidence and regression fishing might be a
possibility. Hence, we are going to test whether the variables that appeared to be
significant in determining ex-post performance will appear to be significant again by
regressing different variables that reflect similar concepts on a similar dependent
variable. The model is setup through variables that intuitively measure the ex-post
performance only, disregarding the ex-ante performance. The setup of the model makes
sense though; due to the structure of the model the dependent variables can be adjusted to
explain the dependent variable in a proportional fashion. Intuitively, the right-hand side
of the model is trying to explain the performance after a turnover, but if we change the
left-hand side from ex-post performance to change in performance then we can change
some of the independent variables located on the right side of the equation. Hence,
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can be changed into

, which measures the

magnitude of how much the team is under or over performing relatively to the
expectations. In addition, the same can be done for

, i.e.

. The change in performance should be determined by the change
in the qualities of the teams played; consequently, this restriction is appropriate for
testing in the model. Nonetheless, the difference between opponent qualities was
excluded from the model since neither of the variables were in the edited short-run
model. The same reasoning can be applied to the old and new coach abilities to get
20.

Several Wald Tests were run on the short and long run final edited model (with
certain restrictions)21 to see whether the coefficients should be restricted in this way for
these pairs of variables. The similar procedure was performed on tavq and tpos. Looking
at history of turnovers and earlier literature, a consensus is that teams are considered to be
performing poorly if they are underperforming relative to their expected performance. In
2009-2010 in the Spanish First Division, Real Madrid broke the record of scoring goals
in the history of the league and also achieved an all-time most wins at home in their
history. But Real Madrid fans were not happy. They have performed well but not better
than Barcelona, their biggest rival. Teams in general dismiss managers due to less-thanexpected performance and not literally poor performance (De Paola, 2008; Frick &
Simmons, 2008; Rowe 2005). Therefore, there is an incentive to try and restrict these

20

Note that putting the regression in this form forces the ex-ante coefficients to equal the
negative of the ex-post coefficients
21
The edited short run model was taken from the earlier sections and the dependent
variable was changed to the difference of performances. Similarly, the edited long run
model was also altered.
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coefficients. Indeed, the F-statistic that was computed cannot reject the null hypothesis at
the five percent significance level. From a soccer-analysis standpoint, this means that
these variables could be of same form and their coefficients could have the same
magnitude with opposite signs.
We utilize from the same test in order to check whether this same structure is
possible with the two variables: old coach ability and new coach ability.
Table 10. Wald Test – Team Average Quality & Position (SR22)
Wald Test: C(TPOS)=-C(TAVQ)
Equation: SHORTRUN
Test Statistic
t-statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

Value

df

Probability

0.031967
0.001022
0.001022

109
(1, 109)
1

0.9746
0.9746
0.9745

The difference between the skills of the coaches should intuitively explain the difference
between ex-post and ex-ante performances. The following table depicts the Wald test
results for this restriction on the final edited short-run model.
Table 11. Wald Test – New & Old Coach Abilities (SR)
Wald Test: C(NCABIL)=-C(OCABIL)
Equation: SHORTRUN
Test Statistic
t-statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

Value

df

Probability

0.966890
0.934876
0.934876

108
(1, 108)
1

0.3358
0.3358
0.3336

Indeed, the results are similar to the previous test. That is, the difference version of these
variables is suitable for use since we cannot reject the null hypothesis at any reasonable
level.
Finally, the last pair of variables that are tested: games played at home after and before a
22

Short-Run
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dismissal (phome, ahome). The change of fan support could be proxy for explaining
change of performance. Results yield similarly as other tests as can be seen in Table 12.
Table 12. Wald Test – Ex-post & Ex-ante Game Locations (SR)
Wald Test:
Equation: SHORTRUN

Test Statistic

t-statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

Value

df

Probability

0.679756
0.462069
0.462069

108
(1, 108)
1

0.4981
0.4981
0.4967

The regression analysis was run with including the pairs of variables and Table 13
illustrates the results.
Table 13. Short Run Robustness
Dependent Variable: XP-XA
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/13/13 Time: 23:54
Sample: 1 117
Included observations: 117
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
PHOME-AHOME
NCABIL-OCABIL
TAVQ
PROM*PTQ-TPOS
PNCA-OCABIL

1.871627
1.078696
1.771719
-0.067048
-0.118388
0.825980

1.307261
0.421960
0.901843
0.091607
0.061036
0.674310

1.431716
2.556392
1.964553
-0.731909
-1.939629
1.224925

0.1550
0.0119**
0.0520*
0.4658
0.0550*
0.2232

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.138160
0.099338
2.840585
895.6508
-285.0853
3.558838
0.005056

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1.487179
2.993140
4.975818
5.117468
5.033326
1.730030

**Significant at %5 level. *Significant at %10 level.
Comparing the results to the edited short-run model, we can see that similar variables are
significant. The main three variables that were significant in the short-run model were
phome, ncabil and ptq. Similarly, the significant variables in this regression model with
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same variables are phome-ahome, ncabil-ocabil and prom*ptq-tpos. The results support
the claim that concepts such as location, coach ability and average team quality (team
expectations) are crucial variables when determining performance in the short-run once a
turnover occurs.
Similar Wald tests were ran on the long-run model and it turns out that tavq-tpos,
ncabil-ocabil and prom*ptq-tpos can be used for the robustness model (see appendix).
Table 14. Long Run Robustness
Dependent Variable: XPP-XAP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/14/13 Time: 00:08
Sample: 1 86 88 117
Included observations: 116
Weighting series: GP^2
Weight type: Inverse variance (average scaling)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
TAVQ-TPOS
NCABIL-OCABIL
EXPRNC
PROM*PTQ-TPOS
PNCA
PROM

-0.241943
0.002921
0.072287
0.004006
-0.027033
-0.142412
0.497610

0.049897
0.004388
0.036600
0.001670
0.004165
0.173888
0.248925

-4.848904
0.665848
1.975044
2.399321
-6.490966
-0.818987
1.999033

0.0000
0.5069
0.0508*
0.5181
0.0856*
0.4146
0.0481**

Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.426717
0.395160
0.123549
1.663804
81.58319
13.52214
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
Weighted mean dep.

0.101514
0.181012
-1.285917
-1.119752
-1.218464
2.151184
0.133299

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Durbin-Watson stat

0.056958
0.005048
0.186644
1.728434

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

0.081903
0.187117
3.797120

**Significant at %5 level. *Significant at %10 level.
Once again, our robustness analysis regression is consistent with the edited long-run
model. Both models having similar results to the earlier analysis gives us a stronger
argument in reaching certain conclusions about the factors that affect ex-post
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performance.

F. Conclusion
Dismissals occur quite frequently in businesses and in soccer clubs. Unlike in many
businesses, contract terminations can be attributed more to coaches (CEO equivalents) in
soccer. Our results have yielded interesting theories related to managerial turnovers in the
context of soccer. In the literature, we discussed a few main theories that try to explain
manager dismissals and their after-effects. The scapegoating hypothesis as well as the
coach effect and the vicious cycle hypothesis are three theories that have been the center
of attention for many scholars. Our analysis provides support for the scapegoating
hypothesis but rules out the vicious cycle and coach effect hypotheses; an embarrassing
result for teams who have fired managers in the past.
Through econometric models, a wide array of data was analyzed and interpreted.
Firstly, the constructed control group shows the regression to the mean effect that casted
doubt on the effectiveness of manager terminations. Comparing the results to the
regression group data, it was found that firing coaches does not help team performance
unambiguously. This rules out the vicious cycle claim and the coach effect. These
theories argued that firing a manager worsens the performance of a team while the latter
supports the theory that in the short run there is a honeymoon period in which the team
does perform better. The control group analysis provided evidence against both of these
theories by showing that statistically the control group post performance is the same as
the regression group performance if not worse. The scapegoat hypothesis asserts that
dismissals take place in order to find a person to blame for the performance. Since we see
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that the mid-season dismissals do not matter from our results, scapegoating seems to be a
high possibility in the Turkish Super Toto Super League.
It was found that in the short run, the number of games that are played at home,
the new coach abilities and historical team performance are the consistent factors that
determine the ex-post performance of a team. This supports the hypothesis that coaches
do matter, but not necessarily that a termination is helpful. In addition, the home
advantage seems to play a big role in increasing performance after a turnover. This can
be attributed to the excitement of the fans for a change and therefore supporting their
team strongly in games played in the home stadium of that team.
In the long-run models, we can see similar results. Coach ability and team quality
were still the variables that have seemed to be crucial in determining long-run
performance. Moreover, we see that promoted teams are structurally different than other
teams, and therefore should be analyzed differently. An interesting result that we have
discovered is that promoted teams tend to have different effects. Specifically, coaches
and past performances of newly promoted, inexperienced teams tend to have
considerably distinctive responses to their new coaches, and do not follow their past
performances as much as teams who have been in the division all along.
To conclude, soccer manager dismissals within the 14 years that were analyzed
tend to be not effective, supporting the scapegoating hypothesis. In addition, factors that
affect ex-post performance in the short and long run are mostly based not only on skill
and tradition but also on emotion. Teams perform much better if they are in front of their
fans; confidence and the passion of the fans are definitely factors that facilitate
performance recoveries. The belief that a CEO is the major determinant of performance is
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supported in the context of soccer however a turnover was shown to be ineffective in
various cases.

G. Appendix
Variables that were not introduced the Variables section are introduced and explained
below.
Ex-Post Location (phome): this variable is similar to Ex-Ante Location except
that it is collected by recording the first four games under the new coach.
Ex-Post Opponent Quality (oqpost): this variable has the same characteristics as
the previous one, except it is formed by data from the four games after the dismissal
instead of before.
New Coach Ability (ncabil): this variable is similar to the Old Coach Ability
with the only difference being that it measures the new coach’s ability instead of the one
fired.
Multiple (multpl): is formed as the product of Experience and New Coach
Ability. It allows the model to give different coefficients to coaches with zero experience
and experienced coaches. It is always included with New Coach Ability. Realistically,
the average points per game of a coach should not matter as much if he has coached very
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few games. On the other hand, a coach with years of experience should be able to reflect
his full potential in the current year he is coaching.
Board (brd): equals one if there is a change in the management or board of the
club, and zero otherwise. Changes in the board are highly crucial in soccer. The vision of
a team, the approach a team takes, is highly dependent on the board. A change in board
creates an unstable environment to objectively analyze performances and coach
dismissals. Therefore, this dummy variable is created in order to take into account these
seldom occurrences in the model.
Week (w): is the week in which the manager was fired. A team underperforming
in later weeks is more of a problematic situation than a team underperforming in the first
few weeks. Therefore, this variable is created to keep track of the timing of the dismissal.
Intuitively, a team in, say week 30 (four games until the end of season) might have a brief
coach effect that would result in a satisfied outcome. The variable is included in all the
models in order to take into account of such examples.
Promoted New Coach Ability (pnca): is the product of Promoted and New
Coach Ability. The variable is created to let promoted teams have a different coefficient
for their new coaches. It is expected that coaching a newly promoted team is different
than coaching a team that has been in the division for a couple of years. Having a stable
and developed infrastructure and a confident mentality that is suitable for the first
division is highly crucial in order to perform well. Therefore, the model allows us to
distinguish the influences of coaches in promoted teams. It is used in both the short run
and long run models.
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Promoted Average Team Quality (ptq): is the product of Promoted and
Average Team Quality. Most promoted teams have not been in the first division many
times; therefore, their past average team qualities might not be an accurate proxy. Thus,
this product is introduced to give these promoted teams a different coefficient for their
average quality. It will be used in all the versions of the short-run and long-run model.
Figure 6A. Budget vs.Team Average Quality)
Similar to the relationship between coach ability and budget, the relationship between

team average performances is positively correlated.
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Table 10A. Wald Test –Team Position & Average Quality (LR23)
Wald Test:
Equation: LONGRUN
Test Statistic
t-statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

Value

df

Probability

6.052213
36.62928
36.62928

108
(1, 108)
1

0.0227
0.0227
0.0227

Table 6B. Wald Test – Promoted Team Position & Average Quality (LR)
Wald Test:
Equation: LONGRUN
Test Statistic
t-statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

Value

df

Probability

2.232566
4.984352
4.984352

108
(1, 108)
1

0.1276
0.1276
0.1256

Value

df

Probability

1.182911
1.399278
1.399278

108
(1, 108)
1

0.2394
0.2394
0.2368

Table 7A. Wald Test – New & Old Coach Ability (LR)
Wald Test:
Equation: LONGRUN
Test Statistic
t-statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

The long run Wald tests yield similar results. That is, coach abilities and expected and actual
performance pairs for promoted and all teams are also included in the model.
Table 8A. Wald Test – Opponent Qualities Ante & Post (SR)
Wald Test:
Equation: SHORTRUN
Test Statistic
t-statistic
F-statistic
Chi-square

23

Value

df

Probability

-2.214656
4.904702
4.904702

107
(1, 107)
1

0.0289
0.0289
0.0268

Long Run
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The only pair of variables that we could not use in the short run robustness analysis was opponent
qualities. Indeed the p-value is low enough to reject the null hypothesis.
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